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Abstract 
This paper builds a theory from which to analyse the impact of a statement on an 
internal conflict. The theory is loosely based on the common view of grievance as 
the cause for civil war and heavily influenced by John Austin’s thoughts on 
speech acts. By assuming that conceptions guide a person’s actions and that 
conceptions are shaped by impressions, the conclusion is that impressions from 
statements can affect actions. In other words; statements can affect an internal 
conflict and this theory aims at describing how. 
A second part of the paper applies the theory to the Colombian civil war. Here, 
I analyse how statements and events led to a changing perception of the FARC 
and what the results were. This is a heuristic case study where the theory building 
and the case study are separated as the case primarily serves as a demonstration. 
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1 Introduction 
How can we understand the impact of the United States labelling a guerrilla 
movement a terror organization? How does it change the image of the guerrilla in 
the eyes of civilians, guerrilla members and governments around the world? These 
are some of the questions that I hope to answer by piecing together a social 
constructivist theory that focus on the impact of statements on people’s 
conceptions. 
The overarching aim with this essay is to establish a theory on how statements 
can affect a conflict. The first part of the study will focus on establishing a 
theoretical understanding of civil war as both a military and a conceptual struggle. 
This will then be the basis from which I interpret the implications of a statement. 
A statement directly affects the conceptual struggle and this part of the theory will 
explain how that can also affect the military struggle and the war as a whole. The 
second part of the study brings in speech acts and explains how statements affect 
the conceptual struggle.  This part ends with an analytical framework where I 
propose a general method for analyzing statements and the development in a 
conceptual struggle. 
The third and last part of the study will apply the theory in interpreting 
statements surrounding a conceptual struggle. The ambition with this is to show 
how statements can affect a civil war by putting the theory to practice. The 
conceptual struggle that will be analyzed is that of how the FARC is to be labeled 
and the guiding question for this part of the study will be: 
How have statements affected the labeling of the FARC and what are the 
consequences? 
The struggle over how to describe the FARC is an essential one and ties in to the 
more overarching struggles of legitimacy and moral high ground which will be 
explained further in chapter two. Because of the limited space given to this part of 
the study I will only make a general analysis of the last 15 years, starting with the 
U.S. establishment of a terrorist organization list. The essay will then finish with a 
chapter that presents the results and some conclusion of the theory and its 
operationalization. 
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2 The two struggles in civil war 
Civil wars are more common, last longer and cause far more casualties than 
contemporary interstate wars, they tend to follow different rules and different 
tactics apply. It is an age-old and far from coherent phenomenon that has not been 
as researched as interstate wars historically but gained a lot of interest in recent 
times (Levy & Thompson, 2010, p.186; Heuser, 2010, p.413-416). 
My ambition with this chapter is to present a coherent theory that interprets 
civil war, or perhaps internal conflict in a wider sense, as both a materialistic 
military struggle and an abstract conceptual struggle. By looking at a selection of 
writers and building on earlier theoretical understanding as well as making some 
contributions of my own I will put together a basic theory for civil wars. I will 
divide this chapter into four parts. The first part focuses on the roots of civil war 
and the motivation behind armed conflict. The second part focus on the nature of 
conceptual struggle, the third part on the material struggle and the last part makes 
a brief summary of the chapter as a hole. 
I clearly start with the assumption that the conceptual/material division should 
be central. I want to point out that my choice to split the war into two struggles is 
based on a basic social constructionist understanding. The materialistic struggle 
that is war is very much a real thing but I consider the ideas that surround it to be 
socially constructed. This is my starting point and the objective of this chapter is 
to flesh it out and describe the interconnectivity of the two struggles. 
2.1 The roots 
While examining the roots of civil war there are several theories to work with. 
Poverty seems to provide a good motivation but one should not expect the very 
poorest to revolt as they have to focus on survival (Levy & Thompson, 2010, 
p.187). So people need a certain amount of wealth to afford a war. It would also 
seem like poverty in of itself is not the cause. There are plenty of impoverished 
places in the world where peace reigns and several wealthy places where rebellion 
erupts. The common factor that has been proposed here is grievance. Poverty 
might lead to grievance under certain circumstances but so might poor 
governance, discrimination, lack of political liberties and many other factors. So is 
grievance the key? It certainly seems like a plausible explanation but grievance 
turned out to be a rather bad variable in statistically predicting civil war. This in 
turn gave rise to the idea that it was greed rather than grievance that was the cause 
as it proved better at predicting civil wars. By starting a civil war and gaining 
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control of land you could exploit the land and collect the wealth (Levy & 
Thompson, 2010, p.187-192). 
However, there is a fundamental problem with focusing on greed as the root to 
civil war. The problem of causality: does greed lead to civil war or does greed 
opportunistically erupt where civil war already rages? As the probable answer to 
this question speaks against greed as an explanation we ought to keep our focus 
on grievance. The reason that it proves such a poor statistical explanation is that 
grievance is much more common than civil war. Far from all grievances lead to 
war and even if you were to rank the grievances it would not be the top ones that 
correlate to civil war. Some would argue that the key here is opportunity. It 
certainly sounds reasonable as you would at least like to have a chance of winning 
before you run in to a fight (Levy & Thompson, 2010, p.192-197). So you need a 
grievance and an opportunity in order to be willing to start a civil war, or in other 
words: it is a matter of a calculated risk. If the situation is bad enough and you 
have a real chance to change it; you will go for it. 
The reason that this leads to war rather than some political action is primarily 
the lack of other arenas to fight on. If peaceful protests and political agitation 
where viable options they might be explored first. Indeed it is not uncommon for 
guerillas to form after a political movement has been violently crushed, fighting 
on with a similar agenda but by other means. This brings us to Clausewitz who 
famously said that war is merely a continuation of politics by other means and not 
it´s negation (Bassford, 2012). Of course Clausewitz was talking about interstate 
wars and war as the extension of political differences between states. I will, 
however, argue that the quote holds true for civil wars as well. A civil war fought 
to achieve a goal is much like other political processes aimed at changing the 
status quo. Ergo: when insurgency proves to be the most viable option civil war is 
the natural outcome.  
Aristotle argued that any war needs a political reason (Coker, 2010, p.113). 
This is true for civil wars as well and that political reason may be either 
secessionist or reformist. Regardless of whether the insurgents have secessionist 
or reformist ambitions, however, the underlying political issue is that of 
legitimacy. The regime might lack legitimacy among a certain minority, a certain 
socioeconomic class, in a certain region or among the general population. The 
insurgents need to portrait themselves as the legitimate force in order to gain 
support and weaken the regime while the opposite apply for the regime. Of course 
insurgents can be defeated militarily but if the lack of legitimacy remains new 
insurgents are soon to follow. This goes in line with Machiavelli’s 
recommendation to treat rebellious population with generosity (Heuser, 2010, 
p.427-428) and it seems a rather common insight (Heuser, 2010, p.416). While 
Machiavelli focused on newly conquered territories during the renaissance where 
the legitimacy was in question for obvious reasons I would argue that the same 
holds true for insurgency in a broader sense. Improving the lives of rebellious 
people strikes at their grievance and thus also at their will to rebel. An alternative 
would be to strike at their opportunity by militarizing the region and oppressing 
the population thus minimizing their chances of success. However, this would be 
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a costly alternative and prove contra productive in the long run as it increases the 
population’s grievance (Heuser, 2010, p.416-418). 
One important thing to add to this idea of grievance and opportunity is that 
both of these are really conceptions. Grievance is obviously a personal feeling and 
while it is affected by the surrounding circumstances it is ultimately determined 
by individuals. The same goes for opportunity, it is not the actual chance to 
succeed but rather the perceived chance that matters when deciding whether to 
strike or not. 
Now, if we take this basic theoretical understanding and look at the Arab 
spring we get an idea of its implications. There was already a great amount of 
grievance among a large part of the population in the Arab world but the 
opportunity to succeed in toppling their governments seemed very small. In 
Tunisia however the grievance grew so strong that the risk seemed worth it. When 
Ben Ali was ousted the perceived opportunity drastically changed in the 
surrounding countries and the risk calculation changed with it. Suddenly 
insurgency and riots became viable strategies in changing the political status quo. 
Mubarak tried to make some political changes to strike at the population’s 
grievance while Gaddafi focused on minimizing their chance of success. 
Mubarak’s actions were too little too late and increased the protesters perceived 
opportunity while Gadhafi’s actions strengthened the grievance and riled up 
support for the rebels both nationally and internationally. If we take a quick look 
at Bahrain, the popular uprising was defeated militarily but new uprisings are sure 
to follow as the government’s violence strengthened the population’s grievance. 
These cases show the connection between conception and strategy. It is a 
central part of the theory I wish to establish and something that will be explained 
further in the subsequent sections of this chapter. 
2.2 The conceptual struggle 
What is the conceptual struggle? In some sense the conceptual struggle is the 
struggle over reality. It is the struggle over how to describe the world around us; 
what is good, what is bad, what is and what simply is not. This is by no means a 
struggle that is confined to situations of civil war or the belligerent sides in such 
wars. It is an ever on-going struggle with countless of different subjects and 
viewpoints. Different churches, interest-groups, political parties, governments, 
universities and other institutions take part in this struggle and most of them will 
struggle internally as well. 
If we look at the American debate on climate change we get a clear example of 
this conceptual struggle. Is global warming real and is it man made? Different 
groups struggle to turn their conception of reality into the commonly accepted 
one. Since the objective truth is not directly obvious, interpretation and the loud 
voices of different actors play a central role in the shaping of people’s 
conceptions. Some say that it is all a hoax, some claim it’s a natural occurrence, 
some argue that it is our fault and others are sure to contend different viewpoints 
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(Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006). While you can categorize the different viewpoints, 
all individual people are sure to have individual conceptions with varying grades 
of similarities. The conceptual struggle is the struggle to convince others that your 
conception is the superior one. 
The same kind of struggle goes on during a civil war where a number of 
different issues become important. Some struggles concern values and others 
concern actual circumstances but all are based on perceptions. Is the government 
popularly supported? Is the government legitimate? Are parts of the population 
treated unfairly? Is the government responsible for violence against its 
population? Is the government incompetent? There is a massive amount of issues 
and some are more important than others. Different conflicts have different issues 
and the development in the conceptual struggles is sure to affect the material 
struggle. 
If the government is perceived as illegitimate the insurgents are more likely to 
gain support which means more resources and possibly desertions for the 
government. If the government is perceived as legitimate and no grievance exists 
there would be no insurgents to begin with. French general François-Jacques-
André Duchemin wrote about pirates and how they were like a plant that would 
only grow in a certain soil (Heuser, 2010, s.432). I argue that this soil is a set of 
conceptions among the population rather than just the actual circumstances. After 
all; grievance is a conception and it does not simply go away when the source 
goes away. 
As I explained above there are countless of different conceptual struggles 
going on simultaneously and different actors take different roles. There are, 
however, some important differences between them. As I mentioned, some focus 
on questions of morality where there is a sense of agreement on facts while others 
focus on the facts themselves. The struggle over torture being a valid strategy is a 
clear moral one and depending on how it goes it can affect the material struggle 
by providing or prohibiting certain actions (Davis, 2008, p.198-203).  
The conceptual struggles are by no means detached from actual events as 
references to them play a central role in conceptual struggles. Describing your 
opponent as ruthless gains much more credibility if you could also point at an 
event where they acted ruthlessly. It seems obvious that the ones depicted as 
ruthless should want to oppose this image and while that might usually be the case 
there are certainly examples of the opposite. When a terror organization takes 
responsibility for an attack that they may not even be responsible for they have a 
different motive e.g. to appear strong and fearsome. There seems to be a lack of a 
conceptual struggle in these cases as one side accuses and the other simply admits. 
Similarities can be seen in some ethnic and religious conflicts where proponents 
from both sides focus on invoking fear in the opposition rather than trying to win 
them over. A reasonable conclusion would be that such conflicts are more violent 
as the demonization of the enemy lacks proper opposition. Religious and ethnic 
conflicts of a non-inclusionary character can lead to the conceptual struggle over 
whether the people on the opposing side are even to be considered human. It is 
during these types of conflicts that the worst atrocities are committed (Kiernan, 
2010, p.85, 217, 537 & 695; Heuser, 2010, p.416).  
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Another important struggle during insurgencies is whether the insurgents are to 
be considered as part of a mass-movement and represent a broader sentiment or an 
extremist minority. As an extremist minority is easier to tackle than a mass 
movement it is in the interest of rebels to seek sentiment among the general 
population. This ties in to the larger question of legitimacy. I argue that this is the 
central conceptual struggle in most civil wars. Arguments over who has the moral 
high ground, who would be most capable in leading the country and who would 
do best at representing the will of the people all tie in to it. 
2.3 The material struggle 
What I have chosen to label the material struggle is primarily a struggle fought for 
and with material means. But this is a struggle heavily dependent on people’s 
conceptions, and thus ties in with the conceptual struggles. As mentioned in the 
previous section the perception of the general population matters as it determines 
the strength of the insurgency and the likelihood of desertions in the military. 
So, the military struggle is affected by the conceptual struggles but as 
conceptual struggles are affected by actual events the influence goes both ways. 
An excessive use of violence or indeed any use of violence can damage the 
perception of a party in a civil war. It is therefore important to legitimize your 
actions. This brings us back to the matter of torture as an example of a method 
that has gained legitimacy by referring to terrorism which makes it a more viable 
option (Davis, 2008, p.198-203). 
In the previous section I mentioned Machiavelli’s recommendation to act with 
generosity in order to avoid rebellions. By heeding the words of Spanish general 
Santa Cruz de Marcenado it would also seem like violent actions after a rebellion 
has erupted are problematic. Santa Cruz argued that any counterinsurgency 
needed to be swift as any military suppression would benefit the rebels (Heuser, 
2010, s.429-430). In other words it would benefit their stance in relevant 
conceptual struggles. This goes to show how military strikes at your enemy, even 
if successful can be contra productive in some cases. The French 
counterinsurgency campaign in Algeria during the twentieth century provide good 
example of contra productive violence. While the material struggle went well and 
France regained much of the territory, their brutality made sure that they could 
never be perceived as legitimate rulers again (Heuser, 2010, p.416, 423-424, 426-
427 & 434). 
While looking at historical accounts it would seem as if contra productive acts 
of violence are really common during insurgencies (Heuser, 2010, p.416). This 
might be conceived as a big problem for the theoretical understanding that I 
propose. However, the idea that these acts of violence are contra productive 
highlights the fact that armed conflicts are seldom fought with rationality. But 
then again as conceptions are what guide us; is it not reasonable to do your worst 
when fighting what you perceive to be the pinnacle of evil? This is why 
conceptual are central in all conflicts. 
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2.4 A basic theory of civil war 
To start off where I left off, conceptions are essential to internal conflicts. For a 
civil war to break out, at least part of the population needs to have some amount 
of grievance towards their government. Furthermore they need to perceive 
insurgency as the most viable alternative at resolving their situation and the 
perceived chance at success needs to be good enough. To circumvent an 
insurgency the best method is to strike against the population’s grievance by 
alleviating their situation.  
Once a civil war has broken out there are a great many different conceptual 
struggles of importance. The struggle over what measures are acceptable can 
determine what measures are used and the struggle over what side is fighting with 
more brutality can determine the popular support. While the abstract nature of 
conceptual struggles makes it hard to generalize over space and time, the struggle 
over legitimacy and what side best represent the will of the people is often 
essential. 
Lastly, I do not wish to downplay the importance of actual events, they affect 
the conceptual struggle at least as much as the conceptual struggle affects them. 
However, the point here is to separate them. The full impact of actual events 
cannot be understood without first evaluating the impact on people’s conceptions. 
The same event will have different implications in different surroundings and the 
same goes for statements, which is something that will be explained further in the 
next chapter. 
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3 Looking at statements 
My division into a material and a conceptual struggle in the previous chapter 
leaves one fundamental question. By what means are the conceptual struggles 
fought? I briefly presented how the conceptual struggle was something very 
abstract but in order to analyse it we must know how to recognize it. I also led on 
that it was fought with agitation as different conceptions faced off against each 
other. This might have been a bit of an oversimplification and quite contradictory 
as I went on to describe how some conceptual struggles were marked by a lack of 
struggle. So saying that a conceptual struggle is fought with agitation is not quite 
right. To agitate requires awareness but the conceptual struggle is more often 
fought subconsciously. At the very least it is not a requirement to fully know what 
you are doing in order to have an impact. 
So, back to the question: by what means are the conceptual struggles fought? 
Well, at its very least it is fought with words. As a struggle between different 
conceptions it really does not require any knowledge of the material world, it only 
requires conceptions of it. The conceptual struggles are fought with written and 
uttered words. But then, what is a word by itself? A better requirement would be a 
collection of words, set in a sequence where a meaning is conveyed. I really am 
not going to get in to the grammatical requirements here as I have little interest in 
it. Suffice to say that a collection of words is a bad requirement. If one really is to 
describe the means of witch a conceptual struggle I fought, “with statements” is 
the most appropriate description. 
Different actors make certain statements that support certain conceptions. As I 
just mentioned, it does not have to be an active choice. Indeed, certain statements 
may weaken the very conceptions they were meant to strengthen and others can 
affect conceptions they were not even meant to address. Still, the question of what 
a statement is remains. A textbook definition would be something in line with: a 
communication or declaration in speech or writing. British philosopher John 
Austin described how earlier philosophers regarded statements to be either true or 
false and goes on to argue that this is a fundamentally bad distinction (Austin 
1975, p.1-14). When analysing conceptual struggles I would agree that it is of 
little importance whether a statement is true or not since it is conceptions rather 
than reality that matters. It is not important who is right when determining who 
wins an argument; it is about the ability to convince the audience. Truth is of little 
importance in determining whether people will believe it or not. 
And still, most of what we know, or rather, perceives to be true comes from 
different statements. If we did not witness it ourselves; see it with our own eyes, 
hear it with our own ears, smell it with our own nose or feel it with our own hands 
we can only learn of it by statements from others. This is why statements play the 
central role in shaping our conceptions in most matters. 
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3.1 Speech acts 
It is time to determine how we should understand the impact of a statement. For 
this, I have chosen to look at John Austin’s posthumous How to do things with 
words and his ideas surrounding speech acts. Realizing that it is a trail of thought 
with many other influences that has expanded much since his departure I still find 
it a great source of inspiration and a fitting base to build upon. 
Austin started out by making a sharp distinction between constative and 
performative utterances before concluding that statements can be seen as speech 
acts. He talks about the locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. The 
locutionary act is that of uttering or writing the statement, the illocutionary act is 
the purpose behind it and the perlocutionary act is the intended or unintended 
effects of the statement (Austin 1975, p.91-132). Let’s say that the illocutionary 
act is the intent to inform a crowd of a fire. The locutionary act may then be the 
utterance of the statement: “Listen up, there is a fire.” Assuming that the crowd 
hears and believes the statement they should now be informed, but they might also 
be alarmed which was never intended, both of these effects are perlocutionary 
acts. In this case the informing of the crowd was a perlocutionary objective 
(intended effect) and the alarming of the crowd was a perlocutionary sequel 
(unintended consequence) (Austin 1975, p118).  
Both of these perlocutionary acts are important to me. Whether the effects are 
intended or not is interesting when analysing the actor that issued the statement 
but it is off less importance when focusing on the effect on peoples conceptions. 
Furthermore it is much too complicated to get a proper grip of someone else’s 
rezoning in issuing a statement which leads to unneeded interpretation. The 
locutions are obviously still important, however, as they constitute the source. In 
his lectures, Austin opened up for the idea that just about all statements that are 
made can have some sort of perlocutionary effect as they can affect people’s 
emotions and thoughts (Austin 1975 p139). This is something that geos in line 
with my own train of thought. However, on this note I will go one step further; I 
make the bold claim that all statements do effect conceptions, even the most 
insignificant ones. An insignificant statement will probably have an insignificant 
effect but it is important to make the distinction between an insignificant effect 
and no effect at all. An obvious objection towards this may be found in the case 
where the statement effectively lacks an audience. It might be uttered in an empty 
room or written on a piece of paper that is burned before it ever gets read. One 
might argue that this would not constitute an actual statement but I give a different 
answer. If we expand the definition from just uttered and written words to also 
include thoughts we can argue that all thoughts effect the conceptions of the 
person who is thinking. In this case the unheard statement will still affect the actor 
who issues the statement. And after all, any statement must first be shaped in the 
mind before it can be conveyed. Still, this is not a particularly important 
exposition as we move on. 
All statements are speech acts and a statement is the conveying of meaning 
through writing or speaking i.e. a collection of words. But then, why limit 
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ourselves to words? Surely a meaning can be conveyed by other means. Can an 
artist not make a statement through a painting or an installation without ever using 
a word? And surely, people can make statements trough gestures. Of course they 
can. Here is where we distance ourselves from statements and shift our focus to 
speech acts. A statement might be a speech act but so might a painting or a 
gesture. I would also argue that the cheer lack of a statement can be seen as a 
speech act in itself in certain situations. E.g. actively criticize one party in a binary 
conflict but not the other presupposes a passive condolence of the other party 
(Austin 1975, p.48-51).  
So, back too speech acts; according to my interpretation of perlocutionary acts 
all the actions that affect someone’s conceptions are speech acts. This does not 
mean that all such acts are interesting; surely we must make a distinction between 
influential and non-influential speech acts. I propose clarity, strength, spread and 
authority to be the factors that determine the influence of a statement. The clearer 
the meaning is the more likely it is to be understood which is necessary if it is to 
have any influence. A stronger meaning has a stronger impact as long as it is 
believable. A wider spread means that a larger audience is affected. Lastly, the 
actor behind the speech act matters as different actors have different authority in 
different fields and among different peoples. 
These four factors certainly need some more explanation as they will be 
important when analysing the impact of speech acts which is why the next section 
will be devoted to them. For now, however, I will make some last clarifications as 
to how we can interpret the speech acts themselves.  
In Austin’s last lecture he constructed a system by which speech acts could be 
divided into five classes: vindictives, exercitives, commissives, behabitives and 
expositives. These classifications, however, are based on illocutionary acts which 
makes them of limited use to me (Austin 1975, p.151-152). As I am interested in 
perlocutionary acts that affect conceptions I will make some basic classification of 
my own. 
First of all, I will return to Austin’s initial distinction between constative and 
performative utterances. As the names indicate the constative utterance is one that 
states about reality and a performative is one that in of itself does something. In 
my development of this distinction, a constative speech act is one that promotes a 
certain conception about the world. While a performative speech act is a speech 
act aimed at a clearer sense of doing something. A performative speech act could 
be to threaten, distance, object, apologize etc. i.e. illoutionary acts. A speech act 
can belong to either one or both of these categories and the performative act is 
generally what Austin would call an illocutionary act.  
The reason for making this distinction at all is that constatives and 
performatives have different believability and effect. If you outright say that you 
promise something one might doubt whether you will fulfill the promise but it 
makes little sense to doubt whether it is true that you made a promise. When you 
say something about the world, however, there is every reason to doubt whether it 
is true or not. 
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3.2 What makes it matter 
Clarity, strength, spread and authority. These are the four factors that I have 
pinned down as determining a speech acts impact on a conceptual struggle. While 
I find it difficult to account for my deliberation I shall make an effort to provide 
some insight to my reasoning while describing the factors. My intention is to 
provide a model from which to evaluate the impact of a speech act in hindsight, 
however, my hope is that these factors could also be used to predict the impact 
beforehand. 
Starting with clarity, it is reasonable to assume that a speech act that conveys a 
clear meaning is more likely to have a clear impact on a conceptual struggle. This 
factor could be rather difficult to measure and evaluate but at some level what 
matters is whether the actor performing the speech act says it outright or not. As 
this factor goes hand in hand with the next one they should probably be evaluated 
simultaneously. The idea with strength as a factor is that stronger language or a 
stronger meaning will have a stronger impact. The crux with this is that there will 
probably be a point where the strong meaning starts to feel exaggerated. 
The idea that spread effect the impact on the conceptual struggle is also a 
straight forward one. People need to receive the message in order to be affected. It 
would be natural to look at media penetration at this point however word of mouth 
should not be underestimated and to really get a good grip of the situation would 
be very difficult. So, even if one is to make an extensive analysis of the media one 
should not expect to have a good grip of the actual spread. Word of mouth plays 
an essential role in the conceptual struggle and makes it most difficult to predict 
the impact of a speech act as one would need perfect information of people’s 
conceptions in order to predict their reception, interpretation and intermediating. I 
consider it quite futile to even try to bring this into any predictive analysis but it is 
still important to consider. 
The last factor is one of the more interesting ones. Authority; it certainly is an 
ambiguous word and so I ought to clarify what I mean by it. The basic idea is that 
some actors carry more weight than others and in different fields and among 
different populations. First we can look at the basic ideas from trade theory: size 
and distance. At its most basic, trade theory says that the trade between two 
countries can be determined by the distance and size; bigger and closer means 
more trade. I think it’s reasonable to assume that a large actor has more authority 
than a small one and an actor close to its audience has more authority than one far 
away. Next, the actor’s proficiencies ought to determine its authority in different 
fields. An actor known for its environmental research ought to have more 
authority in matters concerning the environment than other matters. Finally, an 
actor is likely to have varying amount of authority among different people. It is a 
natural assumption that can be addressed in a few different ways; I choose to 
focus solely on confirmation bias as it alone can explain why different people see 
different actors as authorities. People tend to favour information that confirms 
their own beliefs which makes actors that usually agree with them more credible 
(Nickerson 1998). Confirmation bias is also an important factor when analysing 
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the effect of a speech act. If the message is vague, it can be interpreted in different 
ways and people are prone to interpret it as a confirmation of their pre-existing 
conceptions (Austin 1975 p.72-73). 
3.3 The analytical framework 
It is time to be brief and clarify how the analysis will be structured. The crux is to 
simplify and generalize without drawing the questionable conclusions. First off, I 
will focus on statements. In the last chapter I made a rather big deal of the fact 
that speech acts include more than statements but I have also made it clear that 
statements should be understood as speech acts. The reason that I focus on 
statements alone is that they are the most important speech acts and certainly the 
easiest ones to analyse. I am open to the idea of analysing other non-statement 
speech acts but will refrain from it myself. 
Secondly, when starting with a statement; the first step is to find out what 
conceptual struggle it addresses. On the other hand, when starting with a 
conceptual struggle; the first step is to find the most influential statements in that 
struggle. It is important to get an overview in this initial stage in order to make an 
adequate definition and delimitation of the conceptual struggle. 
Thirdly, it is time to analyse the statement(s). First you determine if the speech 
act is constative, performative or a combination of the two. If it is performative 
you determine what action is being made and if it is constative you determine 
what is being implied. It is important to interpret the statement from all its angles 
in order to acknowledge all that is being conveyed. It might be useful to transform 
the statement into first person in order to make the meaning explicit (Austin 1975, 
p.61-62). After this it is time to evaluate the statement based on its clarity, 
strength, spread and authority. It is worth to point out that these factors should 
also play a role in determining what statements to analyse when starting with a 
conceptual struggle. 
Finally, it is time to evaluate the statement. If you are analysing the impact of 
a single statement it is important to include some external material when 
describing the impact. When focusing on a conceptual struggle you can compare 
the different statements and possibly see a shift in the struggle. In both of these 
cases, however, it is important to bear in mind what happens in the material 
struggle as this will also have an impact. 
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4 Labeling the FARC 
As I mentioned in the second chapter there are numerous conceptual struggles of 
importance in a civil war. I will focus on the struggle to define the opposition, 
more precisely how to define the FARC in the Colombian civil war. As I 
described extensively in chapter two this can affect the support for the guerilla 
which is essential to the development of the war. If the opposition is seen as a 
small band of violent extremists it is easier to wipe them out but if they are seen 
as the representatives of the popular opinion and the ones fighting a brutal regime 
the opposite applies. As the Colombian civil war has several different actors my 
choice to focus on the FARC alone stems from my understanding of the 
conceptual conflict. While statements surrounding the FARC often include other 
guerilla movements (most notably the ELN) I will make an effort to focus on the 
FARC alone. As I see the struggle of how to define the other movements as other 
conceptual struggles they will only be mentioned when they matter to the struggle 
of how to define the FARC. 
While it would be good to really dig in deep when analyzing this conceptual 
struggle I will have to make an effort to be brief and contain the analysis to a few 
selected statements. This part of the stud is mainly a demonstration of the theory 
and will therefore only be given a limited space. Because of the limited space 
given to this analysis I will refrain from analyzing the actors behind the 
statements to any greater extent. 
4.1 Choosing statements 
The first statement I will look at is the U.S. establishment of a foreign terrorist 
organizations list in 1997. It is the first occasion where the FARC are formally 
declared to be terrorists (U.S. 2012). This marks the start of the period that I will 
analyze; it certainly is not the start of the struggle over how to define the FARC 
but it marks an important turning point. The next statement is the inclusion of the 
paramilitary group AUC on the list in 2001. The third statement is the EU:s 
inclusion of the FARC on its terror organization list in 2002 (sometimes called 
blacklist), a list where AUC were already present. After that I will look at 
statements from Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez and his Ecuadorian 
counterpart Rafael Correa as well as some statements from the FARC themselves. 
These influential developments in the conceptual struggle will then be put in a 
greater context as the link with the material struggle is clarified. It is important to 
note that I have made an effort to pick the more important statements in the 
conceptual struggle of how to define the FARC. 
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4.2 The impact of statements 
In an effort to embargo terrorism the U.S department of state established a list of 
foreign terrorist organizations on October 10, 1997. The list contained 
organizations such as HAMAS, Hezbollah, PLF, the Khmer Rouge and ETA. The 
organizations were subject to economic sanctions and other restrictions aimed at 
discouraging terrorism. The list also contained the FARC and ELN which 
effectively linked them with the other organizations (U.S. 2012). 
If we start with the performative speech act; I judge it as a condemnation of the 
FARC. By putting them on the list they are also equating them and the other 
organizations. As the list does not contain the paramilitary umbrella organization 
AUC who certainly meet the requirements, they are also passively consenting to 
the AUC (U.S. 2012). The constative speech act is quite clear: the FARC is a 
terrorist organization and the AUC is not. While the U.S. department of state 
never argued that their list was all-inclusive the fact that the two largest guerilla 
movements in Colombia were on the list but the AUC was not is important. It is 
also reasonable to assume that the lack of AUC on the list made the constative 
speech act less credible. The FARC and ELN are equated to other more or less 
unknown foreign organizations and denounced by the U.S. The U.S. condemning 
communist guerrillas is old news and so this statement is hardly doing something 
new. The statement is not particularly strong but quite clear. However, the spread 
is harder to evaluate. Regarding the U.S. authority in labeling the FARC a terrorist 
organization; it is no secret that they are backing the Colombia government and 
the fact that the AUC was not on the list does not make their case stronger. 
Overall I regard this first statement as somewhat toothless. 
The AUC was later added to the list on September 10, 2001 and we all know 
what happened the day after that. As the U.S was attacked by another organization 
on the list the terrorist accusation suddenly became more potent. A few months 
later the FARC publicly denounced the terrorist label imposed by the U.S. The 
FARC was equated with their enemy (the AUC) and al-Qaeda that had just 
performed one of the most spectacular and widely condemned attacks ever (U.S. 
2012; Ferrer, 2001). At this stage the U.S. was no longer just declaring Colombian 
guerillas and some foreign organizations terrorists. Now, the FARC was linked 
with AUC and al-Qaeda, effectively linking large parts of the Colombian conflict 
with a major attack solely aimed at civilians. These events made the speech act 
much stronger and clearer than earlier. With September 11 as a backdrop the 
meaning of the word terrorist changed. The constative speech act that the FARC is 
a terrorist organization is now more credible than before since there is no 
discrimination between them and the AUC.  
In the statement issued by the FARC they objected to having the situation in 
Colombia directly compared with that in Israel, Afghanistan, Northern Ireland and 
Spain. This is a performative speech act; they are distancing themselves from the 
other organizations on the list and the terrorist label, with a bit of interpretation 
this shows how terrorist accusation just became potent. Why else would they wait 
almost four years before rejecting the notion? 
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In the wake of the September 11 attacks the EU established a terrorist 
organization list of their own. Because of opposition from Sweden and France the 
FARC was not included on the initial draft while the AUC was (Hilton 2002; 
2002/340/CFSP). When the list was updated one month later the FARC was 
included after a strong push from Spain. This statement must be seen against the 
earlier developments and constitutes an affirmation of the U.S. constative speech 
act of describing the FARC as terrorists and linking them to AUC and al-Qaeda. 
In a performative sense the EU and its member states condone the FARC. 
Suddenly it is not just the Colombian government and its old ally, the U.S. that 
condone the FARC but also a collection of some 20 European countries. This was 
before the great enlargement of the EU but the treaty was ratified by the candidate 
countries as well which, arguably, made it more potent (Hilton 2002; 
2002/462/CFSP). In 2003 Canada followed the U.S. and EU in establishing a 
similar list with the FARC and AUC included (PSC 2012). At this point large 
parts of Europe and North America have declared the FARC a terrorist 
organization and actively or passively supported the Colombian government in the 
war. It is important to note that these lists have some very real and direct material 
restrictions as they come with economic sanctions and other legal actions aimed at 
the organizations. However, I am still more interested in the conceptual 
implications and would argue that they are more important. 
The impact of the September 11 attacks and the EU declaring the AUC and 
FARC terrorist organizations even though Sweden and France used to oppose 
such a move changed the situation profoundly. There is a heavy weight behind the 
conception that the FARC and AUC are terrorists, just like al-Qaeda. At this point 
there is a strong and palpable condemnation of the non-state actors in the 
Colombian civil war. The EU:s move to list the FARC as a terrorist organization 
is both strong and clear. At the same time it was more widespread and had more 
authority behind it. Now it was a collection of countries that condemned the 
FARC and while none of them had supported the guerilla before some of them, 
most notably Sweden, used to pursue neutrality. 
The strong push for describing the FARC as terrorist is not unopposed 
however. The opposition comes from Venezuela, Cuba and Ecuador. Venezuelan 
president Hugo Chavez is a popular figure in the region and heavily rejects the 
notion of the FARC as terrorists (CNN 2008). The regional powers: Brazil and 
Mexico, both take a more passive and neutral stance in neither declaring the 
FARC a terrorist organization nor objecting to the U.S. or EU policies. The notion 
of the FARC as terrorists is perhaps not supreme but it certainly gained a lot of 
support in the five years after its conception in 1997. 
With both the FARC and AUC declared terrorist organizations by the EU and 
U.S. the Colombian president Álvaro Uribe Vélez is pushing for a demobilization 
of the AUC. As the AUC has enjoyed strong connections with the Colombian 
state it was important for Uribe to remove himself from them in order to gain 
support for an offensive against the FARC. As large parts of the AUC 
demobilized Uribe enjoyed strong international support for his offensive and the 
FARC suffered because of it (PBS 2008). 
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In February of 2008 massive protests were orchestrated against the FARC. It 
would be wrong to attribute this solely to the changing label of the FARC but I 
would argue that it certainly is a part of it (BBC-1 2008). The claim that the 
FARC is a terrorist organization is credible as it is aimed at both sides of the 
conflict and both organizations have committed notorious attacks against 
civilians. In short; the events in the material struggle supports the conceptual 
claim that the FARC are terrorists. When the AUC demobilizes, the FARC 
remains a terrorist organization in the public mind but are no longer fighting 
another terrorist organization. The protests are therefore aimed solely at them 
which strike at their credibility in fighting the good fight. 
When the Colombian army moved into Ecuador in 2008 to strike at FARC 
forces Ecuadorian president Rafael Correa reacted strongly. He condemned the 
incursion and broke off diplomatic relations (Reel 2008). When allegations about 
Correa being tied to the FARC were raised, however, he strongly denied ever 
having any relation with them (Markey, 2008). Later that year Chavez rejected the 
FARC:s use of kidnappings and claimed that guerilla warfare had no place in 
contemporary Latin America (BBC-2 2008). These statements are by no means 
strong rejections of the FARC but they are certainly important. Hugo Chavez and 
Rafael Correa were two of the strongest supporters of the FARC but Correa does 
not want to be associated with them anymore and Chavez rejects their methods. 
This is criticism from within. I argue that it is indicative of the terror-labels 
progress and a marginalization of the FARC. In 2012 Correa went one step further 
and promised to eliminate any FARC presence in Ecuador (Barrett 2012), perhaps 
a response to the longevity of the FARC-connection allegations. Nevertheless, it 
was a very strong rejection of a guerilla that he once spoke favorably about. 
In February, 2012 the FARC declared that they were to stop their kidnappings 
(CNN 2012). I see this as a direct response to their bad situation in the conceptual 
struggle. Chavez’s rejection of kidnappings is important but so were the massive 
demonstrations and the heavy public opinion. The FARC changed their tactics and 
risked their material strength in order to improve their badly damaged reputation. 
At this point the FARC are damaged goods. The notion that they should be 
described as a terrorist organization has gained sufficient support to dissuade 
others from associating with them. It is important to note that the same period 
does not show an increase in violence on behalf of the FARC. The changing 
opinion comes from a changing perception of what the FARC are. The idea that 
they are terrorists implies that their violence is senseless and mainly aimed at 
civilians, whether this is true or not is of less importance. 
Later in 2012, the Colombian government engages in negotiation with the 
FARC. It is far from the first time but the government has a stronger hand than 
ever before (Koranyi 2012). With the FARC labeled a terrorist organization, 
fighting against a sovereign state, the prospect of them winning a civil war is 
close to insignificant. Let’s go back to the notion of chance and grievance being 
necessary for insurgency to erupt. As the FARC becomes marginalized the chance 
of success sinks and with the demobilization of the AUC the cause for grievance 
sinks as well. While this might not mean the end of the conflict I would argue that 
it does change the terms. 
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5 Conclusions 
5.1 The role of statements in labeling the FARC 
In chapter two I described how different conflicts had different conceptual 
struggles of importance. I regard the conflict over how to define the Colombian 
guerillas as one of the most important conceptual struggle in the Colombian civil 
war. The attacks on September 11 and the U.S. war on terror are certainly central 
in this conceptual struggle and it is interesting to note how events in a foreign 
country can affect an internal conflict even though there are no direct connections. 
When the U.S. first established their list of foreign terrorist organizations it 
had a very small impact but that changed with September 11. The whole world 
saw the footage from New York. It was a massive attack aimed at a civilian target 
and suddenly the list of foreign terrorist organizations became more important. I 
do not claim that the FARC was loved by all before this but after this it became 
easier to draw a straight connection between the FARC, AUC and al-Qaeda. 
FARC and AUC were certainly guilty of murdering civilians and that made them 
terrorists. Being terrorists also implies that the violence is meaningless or at the 
very least excessive. The development in the conceptual struggle over how to 
label the FARC has played a central role in their marginalization and led to them 
denouncing kidnappings. 
It is important to note that Cuba and Venezuela still rejects the terrorist label 
and that many Colombians are sure to prefer their authority to that of the U.S. and 
EU. As I have already stated, the idea that the FARC should best be described as a 
terrorist organization does not reign supreme. However, I conclude that it is a 
conception that has gained a lot of strength in the past 15 years and plays a central 
part in explaining how the civil war has developed. 
5.2 The theory 
How can one be so certain that this terrorist label is so central in the FARC:s 
demise? It is high time to clarify what this conclusion requires in terms of 
assumptions. I have a clear social constructivist approach and regard people’s 
conceptions as central. I build on the premise that conceptions determine our 
actions in a way that allows some basic assumptions to be based on it. At the same 
time I do not wish to undervalue the importance of the material world. 
Conceptions are at the heart of any conflict and while actual events certainly 
affect a person’s conceptions, statements still play a central role. I would argue 
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that actual events can be more influential but also more rare. Having witnessed an 
attack first hand is probable to affect someone exponentially more than merely 
hearing about it. It is therefore important to know how widespread the violence is. 
This is also something that can explain the impact of the September 11 attacks. 
We have all seen the horrible videos of the planes hitting the towers, it is a very 
iconic event and many people have strong memories of it even if they weren’t 
there.  
One of the trails of thought that I find most interesting is that different 
conceptions could be the base for conflict in itself. Furthermore, this line between 
different conceptions may go along ethnic, religious, linguistic, ideological or 
socioeconomic borders and when the gap is great enough it becomes hard to 
empathize with the other side. This might start a conceptual struggle to portrait the 
counterpart as something pure evil or lesser. Whether they are subhuman, heretics, 
communists, fascists, bourgeoisies or plebs they are fair game. As no one listens 
to the counterpart, this demonization can reign free until they are worth less than 
dirt and murdering them is no longer conceived as morally wrong.  
I will make no attempt at summarizing the theory as I have spent most of this 
paper building it. Nevertheless, as a last comment I will point out that the theory 
remains untested and could benefit from further development. My main concern is 
with the method I detailed in the end of chapter three; it is hard to set up clear 
guidelines for an analysis of such an abstract phenomenon. 
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